(Calvin, Institutes on the Christian Religion 1, part 13)
Chapter 15
15. State in which man was created. The faculties of the soul - The
image of God - Free will - Original righteousness.
This chapter is thus divided: - I. The necessary rules to be
observed in considering the state of man before the fall being laid
down, the point first considered is the creation of the body, and
the lesson taught by its being formed out of the earth, and made
alive, sec. 1. II. The immortality of the human soul is proved by
various solid arguments, sec. 2. III. The image of God (the
strongest proof of the soul's immortality) is considered, and
various absurd fancies are refuted, sec. 3. IV. Several errors which
obscure the light of truth being dissipated, follows a philosophical
and theological consideration of the faculties of the soul before
the fall.
Sections.
1. A twofold knowledge of God, viz., before the fall and after it.
The former here considered. Particular rules or precautions to
be observed in this discussion. What we are taught by a body
formed ant of the dust, and tenanted by a spirit.
2. The immortality of the soul proved from, 1. The testimony of
conscience. 2. The knowledge of God. 3. The noble faculties
with which it is endued. 4. Its activity and wondrous fancies
in sleep. 5. Innumerable passages of Scripture.
3. The image of God one of the strongest proofs of the immortality
of the soul. What meant by this image. The dreams of Osiander
concerning the image of God refuted. Whether any difference
between "image" and "likeness." Another objection of Osiander
refuted. The image of God conspicuous in the whole Adam.
4. The image of God is in the soul. Its nature may be learnt from
its renewal by Christ. What comprehended under this renewal.
What the image of God in man before the fall. In what things it
now appears. When and where it will be seen in perfection.
5. The dreams of the Manichees and of Servetus, as to the origin of
the soul, refuted. Also of Osiander, who denies that there is
any image of God in man without essential righteousness.
6. The doctrine of philosophers as to the faculties of the soul
generally discordant, doubtful, and obscure. The excellence of
the soul described. Only one soul in each man. A brief review
of the opinion of philosophers as to the faculties of the soul.
What to be thought of this opinion.
7. The division of the faculties of the soul into intellect and
will, more agreeable to Christian doctrine.
8. The power and office of the intellect and will in man before the
fall. Man's free will. This freedom lost by the fall - a fact
unknown to philosophers. The delusion of Pelagians and Papists.
Objection as to the fall of man when free, refuted.
1. We have now to speak of the creation of man, not only
because of all the works of God it is the noblest, and most
admirable specimen of his justice, wisdom, and goodness, but, as we
observed at the outset, we cannot clearly and properly know God
unless the knowledge of ourselves be added. This knowledge is
twofold, - relating, first, to the condition in which we were at
first created; and, secondly to our condition such as it began to be
immediately after Adam's fall. For it would little avail us to know
how we were created if we remained ignorant of the corruption and
degradation of our nature in consequence of the fall. At present,
however, we confine ourselves to a consideration of our nature in
its original integrity. And, certainly, before we descend to the
miserable condition into which man has fallen, it is of importance
to consider what he was at first. For there is need of caution, lest
we attend only to the natural ills of man, and thereby seem to
ascribe them to the Author of nature; impiety deeming it a
sufficient defence if it can pretend that everything vicious in it
proceeded in some sense from God, and not hesitating, when accused,
to plead against God, and throw the blame of its guilt upon Him.
Those who would be thought to speak more reverently of the Deity
catch at an excuse for their depravity from nature, not considering
that they also, though more obscurely, bring a charge against God,
on whom the dishonour would fall if anything vicious were proved to
exist in nature. Seeing, therefore, that the flesh is continually on
the alert for subterfuges, by which it imagines it can remove the
blame of its own wickedness from itself to some other quarter, we
must diligently guard against this depraved procedure, and
accordingly treat of the calamity of the human race in such a way as
may cut off every evasion, and vindicate the justice of God against
all who would impugn it. We shall afterwards see, in its own place,
(Book 2 chap. 1: sec. 3,) how far mankind now are from the purity
originally conferred on Adam. And, first, it is to be observed, that
when he was formed out of the dust of the ground a curb was laid on
his pride - nothing being more absurd than that those should glory
in their excellence who not only dwell in tabernacles of clay, but
are themselves in part dust and ashes. But God having not only
deigned to animate a vessel of clay, but to make it the habitation
of an immortal spirit, Adam might well glory in the great liberality
of his Maker.
2. Moreover, there can be no question that man consists of a
body and a soul; meaning by soul, an immortal though created
essence, which is his nobler part. Sometimes he is called a spirit.
But though the two terms, while they are used together differ in
their meaning, still, when spirit is used by itself it is equivalent
to soul, as when Solomon speaking of death says, that the spirit
returns to God who gave it, (Eccles. 12: 7.) And Christ, in
commending his spirit to the Father, and Stephen his to Christ,
simply mean, that when the soul is freed from the prison-house of
the body, God becomes its perpetual keeper. Those who imagine that
the soul is called a spirit because it is a breath or energy
divinely infused into bodies, but devoid of essence, err too
grossly, as is shown both by the nature of the thing, and the whole
tenor of Scripture. It is true, indeed, that men cleaving too much
to the earth are dull of apprehension, nay, being alienated from the
Father of Lights, are so immersed in darkness as to imagine that
they will not survive the grave; still the light is not so
completely quenched in darkness that all sense of immortality is
lost. Conscience, which, distinguishing, between good and evil,
responds to the judgement of God, is an undoubted sign of an
immortal spirit. How could motion devoid of essence penetrate to the
judgement-seat of God, and under a sense of guilt strike itself with
terror? The body cannot be affected by any fear of spiritual
punishment. This is competent only to the soul, which must therefore
be endued with essence. Then the mere knowledge of a God
sufficiently proves that souls which rise higher than the world must
be immortal, it being impossible that any evanescent vigour could
reach the very fountain of life. In fine, while the many noble
faculties with which the human mind is endued proclaim that
something divine is engraven on it, they are so many evidences of an
immortal essence. For such sense as the lower animals possess goes
not beyond the body, or at least not beyond the objects actually
presented to it. But the swiftness with which the human mind glances
from heaven to earth, scans the secrets of nature, and, after it has
embraced all ages, with intellect and memory digests each in its
proper order, and reads the future in the past, clearly demonstrates
that there lurks in man a something separated from the body. We have
intellect by which we are able to conceive of the invisible God and
angels - a thing of which body is altogether incapable. We have
ideas of rectitude, justice, and honesty - ideas which the bodily
senses cannot reach. The seat of these ideas must therefore be a
spirit. Nay, sleep itself, which stupefying the man, seems even to
deprive him of life, is no obscure evidence of immortality; not only
suggesting thoughts of things which never existed, but foreboding
future events. I briefly touch on topics which even profane writers
describe with a more splendid eloquence. For pious readers, a simple
reference is sufficient. Were not the soul some kind of essence
separated from the body, Scripture would not teach that we dwell in
houses of clay, and at death remove from a tabernacle of flesh; that
we put off that which is corruptible, in order that, at the last
day, we may finally receive according to the deeds done in the body.
These, and similar passages which everywhere occur, not only clearly
distinguish the soul from the body, but by giving it the name of
man, intimate that it is his principal part. Again, when Paul
exhorts believers to cleanse themselves from all filthiness of the
flesh and the spirit, he shows that there are two parts in which the
taint of sin resides. Peter, also, in calling Christ the Shepherd
and Bishop of souls, would have spoken absurdly if there were no
souls towards which he might discharge such an office. Nor would
there be any ground for what he says concerning the eternal
salvation of souls, or for his injunction to purify our souls, or
for his assertion that fleshly lusts war against the soul; neither
could the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews say, that pastors
watch as those who must give an account for our souls, if souls were
devoid of essence. To the same effect Paul calls God to witness upon
his soul, which could not be brought to trial before God if
incapable of suffering punishment. This is still more clearly
expressed by our Saviour, when he bids us fear him who, after he has
killed the body, is able also to cast into hell fire. Again when the
author of the Epistle to the Hebrews distinguishes the fathers of
our flesh from God, who alone is the Father of our spirits, he could
not have asserted the essence of the soul in clearer terms.
Moreover, did not the soul, when freed from the fetters of the body,
continue to exist, our Saviour would not have represented the soul
of Lazarus as enjoying blessedness in Abraham s bosom, while, on the
contrary, that of Dives was suffering dreadful torments. Paul
assures us of the same thing when he says, that so long as we are
present in the body, we are absent from the Lord. Not to dwell on a
matter as to which there is little obscurity, I will only add, that
Luke mentions among the errors of the Sadducees that they believed
neither angel nor spirit.
3. A strong proof of this point may be gathered from its being
said, that man was created in the image of God. For though the
divine glory is displayed in man's outward appearance, it cannot be
doubted that the proper seat of the image is in the soul. I deny
not, indeed, that external shape, in so far as it distinguishes and
separates us from the lower animals, brings us nearer to God; nor
will I vehemently oppose any who may choose to include under the
image of God that
While the mute creation downward bend
Their sight, and to their earthly mother tend,
Man looks aloft, and with erected eyes,
Beholds his own hereditary skies.
Only let it be understood, that the image of God which is beheld or
made conspicuous by these external marks, is spiritual. For
Osiander, (whose writings exhibit a perverse ingenuity in futile
devices,) extending the image of God indiscriminately as well to the
body as to the soul, confounds heaven with earth. He says, that the
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, placed their image in man,
because, even though Adam had stood entire, Christ would still have
become man. Thus, according to him, the body which was destined for
Christ was a model and type of that corporeal figure which was then
formed. But where does he find that Christ is an image of the
Spirit? I admit, indeed, that in the person of the Mediator, the
glory of the whole Godhead is displayed: but how can the eternal
Word, who in order precedes the Spirit, be called his image? In
short, the distinction between the Son and the Spirit is destroyed
when the former is represented as the image of the latter. Moreover,
I should like to know in what respect Christ in the flesh in which
he was clothed resembles the Ho]y Spirit, and by what marks, or
lineaments, the likeness is expressed. And since the expression,
"Let us make man in our own image," is used in the person of the Son
also, it follows that he is the image of himself - a thing utterly
absurd. Add that, according to the figment of Osiander, Adam was
formed after the model or type of the man Christ. Hence Christ, in
as much as he was to be clothed with flesh, was the idea according
to which Adam was formed, whereas the Scriptures teach very
differently, viz., that he was formed in the image of God. There is
more plausibility in the imagination of those who interpret that
Adam was created in the image of God, because it was conformable to
Christ, who is the only image of God; but not even for this is there
any solid foundation. The "image" and "likeness" has given rise to
no small discussion; interpreters searching without cause for a
difference between the two terms, since "likeness" is merely added
by way of exposition. First, we know that repetitions are common in
Hebrew, which often gives two words for one thing; And, secondly,
there is no ambiguity in the thing itself, man being called the
image of God because of his likeness to God. Hence there is an
obvious absurdity in those who indulge in philosophical speculation
as to these names, placing the "Zelem", that is the image, in the
substance of the soul, and the "Demuth", that is the likeness, in
its qualities, and so forth. God having determined to create man in
his own image, to remove the obscurity which was in this terms adds,
by way of explanation, in his likeness, as if he had said, that he
would make man, in whom he would, as it were, image himself by means
of the marks of resemblance impressed upon him. Accordingly, Moses,
shortly after repeating the account, puts down the image of God
twice, and makes no mention of the likeness. Osiander frivolously
objects that it is not a part of the man, or the soul with its
faculties, which is called the image of God, but the whole Adam, who
received his name from the dust out of which he was taken. I call
the objection frivolous, as all sound readers will judge. For though
the whole man is called mortal, the soul is not therefore liable to
death, nor when he is called a rational animal is reason or
intelligence thereby attributed to the body. Hence, although the
soul is not the man, there is no absurdity in holding that he is
called the image of God in respect of the soul; though I retain the
principle which I lately laid down, that the image of God extends to
everything in which the nature of man surpasses that of all other
species of animals. Accordingly, by this term is denoted the
integrity with which Adam was endued when his intellect was clear,
his affections subordinated to reason, all his senses duly
regulated, and when he truly ascribed all his excellence to the
admirable gifts of his Maker. And though the primary seat of the
divine image was in the mind and the heart, or in the soul and its
powers, there was no part even of the body in which some rays of
glory did not shine. It is certain that in every part of the world
some lineaments of divine glory are beheld and hence we may infer,
that when his image is placed in man, there is a kind of tacit
antithesis, as it were, setting man apart from the crowd, and
exalting him above all the other creatures. But it cannot be denied
that the angels also were created in the likeness of God, since, as
Christ declares, (Matth. 22: 30,) our highest perfection will
consist in being like them. But it is not without good cause that
Moses commends the favour of God towards us by giving us this
peculiar title, the more especially that he was only comparing man
with the visible creation.
4. But our definition of the image seems not to be complete
until it appears more clearly what the faculties are in which man
excels, and in which he is to be regarded as a mirror of the divine
glory. This, however, cannot be better known than from the remedy
provided for the corruption of nature. It cannot be doubted that
when Adam lost his first estate he became alienated from God.
Wherefore, although we grant that the image of God was not utterly
effaced and destroyed in him, it was, however, so corrupted, that
any thing which remains is fearful deformity; and, therefore, our
deliverance begins with that renovation which we obtain from Christ,
who is, therefore, called the second Adam, because he restores us to
true and substantial integrity. For although Paul, contrasting the
quickening Spirit which believers receive from Christ, with the
living soul which Adam was created, (1 Cor. 15: 45,) commends the
richer measure of grace bestowed in regeneration, he does not,
however, contradict the statement, that the end of regeneration is
to form us anew in the image of God. Accordingly, he elsewhere shows
that the new man is renewed after the image of him that created him
(Col. 3: 19.) To this corresponds another passage, "Put ye on the
new man, who after God is created," (Eph. 4: 24.) We must now see
what particulars Paul comprehends under this renovation. In the
first place, he mentions knowledge, and in the second, true
righteousness and holiness. Hence we infer, that at the beginning
the image of God was manifested by light of intellect, rectitude of
heart, and the soundness of every part. For though I admit that the
forms of expression are elliptical, this principle cannot be
overthrown, viz., that the leading feature in the renovation of the
divine image must also have held the highest place in its creation.
To the same effect Paul elsewhere says, that beholding the glory of
Christ with unveiled face, we are transformed into the same image.
We now see how Christ is the most perfect image of God, into which
we are so renewed as to bear the image of God in knowledge, purity,
righteousness, and true holiness. This being established, the
imagination of Osiander, as to bodily form, vanishes of its own
accord. As to that passage of St Paul, (1 Cor. 11: 7,) in which the
man alone to the express exclusion of the woman, is called the image
and glory of God, it is evident from the context, that it merely
refers to civil order. I presume it has already been sufficiently
proved, that the image comprehends everything which has any relation
to the spiritual and eternal life. The same thing, in different
terms, is declared by St John when he says, that the light which was
from the beginning, in the eternal Word of God, was the light of
man, (John 1: 4.) His object being to extol the singular grace of
God in making man excel the other animals, he at the same time shows
how he was formed in the image of God, that he may separate him from
the common herd, as possessing not ordinary animal existence, but
one which combines with it the light of intelligence. Therefore, as
the image of God constitutes the entire excellence of human nature,
as it shone in Adam before his fall, but was afterwards vitiated and
almost destroyed, nothing remaining but a ruin, confused, mutilated,
and tainted with impurity, so it is now partly seen in the elect, in
so far as they are regenerated by the Spirit. Its full lustre,
however, will be displayed in heaven. But in order to know the
particular properties in which it consists, it will be proper to
treat of the faculties of the soul. For there is no solidity in
Augustine's speculation, that the soul is a mirror of the Trinity,
inasmuch as it comprehends within itself, intellect, will, and
memory. Nor is there probability in the opinion of those who place
likeness to God in the dominion bestowed upon man, as if he only
resembled God in this, that he is appointed lord and master of all
things. The likeness must be within, in himself. It must be
something which is not external to him but is properly the internal
good of the soul.
5. But before I proceed further, it is necessary to advert to
the dream of the Manichees, which Servetus has attempted in our day
to revive. Because it is said that God breathed into man's nostrils
the breath of life, (Gen. 2: 7,) they thought that the soul was a
transmission of the substance of God; as if some portion of the
boundless divinity had passed into man. It cannot take long time to
show how many gross and foul absurdities this devilish error carries
in its train. For if the soul of man is a portion transmitted from
the essence of God, the divine nature must not only be liable to
passion and change, but also to ignorance, evil desires, infirmity,
and all kinds of vice. There is nothing more inconstant than man,
contrary movements agitating and distracting his soul. He is ever
and anon deluded by want of skill, and overcome by the slightest
temptations; while every one feels that the soul itself is a
receptacle for all kinds of pollution. All these things must be
attributed to the divine nature, if we hold that the soul is of the
essence of God, or a secret influx of divinity. Who does not shudder
at a thing so monstrous? Paul, indeed, quoting from Aratus, tells us
we are his offspring, (Acts 17: 28;) not in substance, however, but
in quality, in as much as he has adorned us with divine endowments.
Meanwhile, to lacerate the essence of the Creator, in order to
assign a portion to each individual, is the height of madness. It
must, therefore, be held as certain, that souls, notwithstanding of
their having the divine image engraven on them, are created just as
angels are. Creation, however, is not a transfusion of essence, but
a commencement of it out of nothing. Nor, though the spirit is given
by God, and when it quits the flesh again returns to him, does it
follow that it is a portion withdrawn from his essence. Here, too,
Osiander, carried away by his illusions entangled himself in an
impious error, by denying that the image of God could be in man
without his essential righteousness; as if God were unable, by the
mighty power of his Spirit, to render us conformable to himself,
unless Christ were substantially transfused into us. Under whatever
colour some attempt to gloss these delusions, they can never so
blind the eyes of intelligent readers as to prevent them from
discerning in them a revival of Manicheism. But from the words of
Paul, when treating of the renewal of the image, (2 Cor. 3: 18,) the
inference is obvious, that man was conformable to God, not by an
influx of substance, but by the grace and virtue of the Spirit. He
says, that by beholding the glory of Christ, we are transformed into
the same image as by the Spirit of the Lord; and certainly the
Spirit does not work in us so as to make us of the same substance
with God.
6. It were vain to seek a definition of the soul from
philosophers, not one of whom, with the exception of Plato,
distinctly maintained its immortality. Others of the school of
Socrates, indeed, lean the same way, but still without teaching
distinctly a doctrine of which they were not fully persuaded. Plato,
however, advanced still further, and regarded the soul as an image
of God. Others so attach its powers and faculties to the present
life, that they leave nothing external to the body. Moreover, having
already shown from Scripture that the substance of the soul is
incorporeal, we must now add, that though it is not properly
enclosed by space, it however occupies the body as a kind of
habitation, not only animating all its parts, and rendering the
organs fit and useful for their actions, but also holding the first
place in regulating the conduct. This it does not merely in regard
to the offices of a terrestrial life, but also in regard to the
service of God. This, though not clearly seen in our corrupt state,
yet the impress of its remains is seen in our very vices. For whence
have men such a thirst for glory but from a sense of shame? And
whence this sense of shame but from a respect for what is
honourable? Of this, the first principle and source is a
consciousness that they were born to cultivate righteousness, - a
consciousness akin to religion. But as man was undoubtedly created
to meditate on the heavenly life, so it is certain that the
knowledge of it was engraven on the soul. And, indeed, man would
want the principal use of his understanding if he were unable to
discern his felicity, the perfection of which consists in being
united to God. Hence, the principal action of the soul is to aspire
thither, and, accordingly, the more a man studies to approach to
God, the more he proves himself to be endued with reason.
Though there is some plausibility in the opinion of those who
maintain that man has more than one soul, namely, a sentient and a
rational, yet as there is no soundness in their arguments, we must
reject it, unless we would torment ourselves with things frivolous
and useless. They tell us, (see chap. 5 sec. 4,) there is a great
repugnance between organic movements and the rational part of the
soul. As if reason also were not at variance with herself, and her
counsels sometimes conflicting with each other like hostile armies.
But since this disorder results from the depravation of nature, it
is erroneous to infer that there are two souls, because the
faculties do not accord so harmoniously as they ought. But I leave
it to philosophers to discourse more subtilely of these faculties.
For the edification of the pious, a simple definition will be
sufficient. I admit, indeed, that what they ingeniously teach on the
subject is true, and not only pleasant, but also useful to be known;
nor do I forbid any who are inclined to prosecute the study. First,
I admit that there are five senses, which Plato (in Theaeteto)
prefers calling organs, by which all objects are brought into a
common sensorium, as into a kind of receptacle: Next comes the
imagination, (phantasia,) which distinguishes between the objects
brought into the sensorium: Next, reason, to which the general power
of judgement belongs: And, lastly, intellect, which contemplates
with fixed and quiet look whatever reason discursively revolves. In
like manner, to intellect, fancy, and reason, the three cognitive
faculties of the soul, correspond three appetite faculties viz.,
will, whose office is to choose whatever reason and intellect
propound; irascibility, which seizes on what is set before it by
reason and fancy; and concupiscence, which lays hold of the objects
presented by sense and fancy.
Though these things are true, or at least plausible, still, as
I fear they are more fitted to entangle, by their obscurity, than to
assist us, I think it best to omit them. If any one chooses to
distribute the powers of the mind in a different manner, calling one
appetive, which, though devoid of reason, yet obeys reason, if
directed from a different quarter, and another intellectual, as
being by itself participant of reason, I have no great objection.
Nor am I disposed to quarrel with the view, that there are three
principles of action, viz., sense, intellect, and appetite. But let
us rather adopt a division adapted to all capacities - a thing which
certainly is not to be obtained from philosophers. For they, when
they would speak most plainly, divide the soul into appetite and
intellect, but make both double. To the latter they sometimes give
the name of contemplative, as being contented with mere knowledge
and having no active powers (which circumstance makes Cicero
designate it by the name of intellect, ingenii,) (De Fin. lib. 5.)
At other times they give it the name of practical, because it
variously moves the will by the apprehension of good or evil. Under
this class is included the art of living well and justly. The former
viz., appetite, they divide into will and concupiscence, calling it
"boulesis", so whenever the appetite, which they call "horme", obeys
the reason. But when appetite, casting off the yoke of reason, runs
to intemperance, they call it "pathos". Thus they always presuppose
in man a reason by which he is able to guide himself aright.
7. From this method of teaching we are forced somewhat to
dissent. For philosophers, being unacquainted with the corruption of
nature, which is the punishment of revolt, erroneously confound two
states of man which are very different from each other. Let us
therefore hold, for the purpose of the present work, that the soul
consists of two parts, the intellect and the will, (Book 2 chap. 2
sec. 2, 12,) - the office of the intellect being to distinguish
between objects, according as they seem deserving of being approved
or disapproved; and the office of the will, to choose and follow
what the intellect declares to be good, to reject and shun what it
declares to be bad, (Plato, in Phaedro.) We dwell not on the
subtlety of Aristotle, that the mind has no motion of itself; but
that the moving power is choice, which he also terms the appetite
intellect. Not to lose ourselves in superfluous questions, let it be
enough to know that the intellect is to us, as it were, the guide
and ruler of the soul; that the will always follows its beck, and
waits for its decision, in matters of desire. For which reason
Aristotle truly taught, that in the appetite there is a pursuit and
rejection corresponding in some degree to affirmation and negation
in the intellect, (Aristot. Ethic. lib. 6 sec. 2.) Moreover, it will
be seen in another place, (Book 2 c. 2 see. 12-26,) how surely the
intellect governs the will. Here we only wish to observe, that the
soul does not possess any faculty which may not be duly referred to
one or other of these members. And in this way we comprehend sense
under intellect. Others distinguish thus: They say that sense
inclines to pleasure in the same way as the intellect to good; that
hence the appetite of sense becomes concupiscence and lust, while
the affection of the intellect becomes will. For the term appetite,
which they prefer, I use that of will, as being more common.
8. Therefore, God has provided the soul of man with intellect,
by which he might discern good from evil, just from unjust, and
might know what to follow or to shun, reason going before with her
lamp; whence philosophers, in reference to her directing power, have
called her "to hegemonikon". To this he has joined will, to which
choice belongs. Man excelled in these noble endowments in his
primitive condition, when reason, intelligence, prudence, and
judgement, not only sufficed for the government of his earthly life,
but also enabled him to rise up to God and eternal happiness.
Thereafter choice was added to direct the appetites, and temper all
the organic motions; the will being thus perfectly submissive to the
authority of reason. In this upright state, man possessed freedom of
will, by which, if he chose, he was able to obtain eternal life. It
were here unseasonable to introduce the question concerning the
secret predestination of God, because we are not considering what
might or might not happen, but what the nature of man truly was.
Adam, therefore, might have stood if he chose, since it was only by
his own will that he fell; but it was because his will was pliable
in either directions and he had not received constancy to persevere,
that he so easily fell. Still he had a free choice of good and evil;
and not only so, but in the mind and will there was the highest
rectitude, and all the organic parts were duly framed to obedience,
until man corrupted its good properties, and destroyed himself.
Hence the great darkness of philosophers who have looked for a
complete building in a ruin, and fit arrangement in disorder. The
principle they set out with was, that man could not be a rational
animal unless he had a free choice of good and evil. They also
imagined that the distinction between virtue and vice was destroyed,
if man did not of his own counsel arrange his life. So far well, had
there been no change in man. This being unknown to them, it is not
surprising that they throw every thing into confusion. But those
who, while they profess to be the disciples of Christ, still seek
for free-will in man, notwithstanding of his being lost and drowned
in spiritual destruction, labour under manifold delusion, making a
heterogeneous mixture of inspired doctrine and philosophical
opinions, and so erring as to both. But it will be better to leave
these things to their own place, (see Book 2 chap. 2) At present it
is necessary only to remember, that man, at his first creation, was
very different from all his posterity; who, deriving their origin
from him after he was corrupted, received a hereditary taint. At
first every part of the soul was formed to rectitude. There was
soundness of mind and freedom of will to choose the good. If any one
objects that it was placed, as it were, in a slippery position,
because its power was weak, I answer, that the degree conferred was
sufficient to take away every excuse. For surely the Deity could not
be tied down to this condition, - to make man such, that he either
could not or would not sin. Such a nature might have been more
excellent; but to expostulate with God as if he had been bound to
confer this nature on man, is more than unjust, seeing he had full
right to determine how much or how little He would give. Why He did
not sustain him by the virtue of perseverance is hidden in his
counsel; it is ours to keep within the bounds of soberness. Man had
received the power, if he had the will, but he had not the will
which would have given the power; for this will would have been
followed by perseverance. Still, after he had received so much,
there is no excuse for his having spontaneously brought death upon
himself. No necessity was laid upon God to give him more than that
intermediate and even transient will, that out of man's fall he
might extract materials for his own glory.
Calvin, Institutes on the Christian Religion, Volume 1
(continued in part 14...)
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